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"FAIR AND EQUITABLE" DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING 
POWER UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING 
COMPANY ACT OF 1935 
Leo W. Leary* 
IN THE Public Utility Holding Cqmpany Act of 1935
1 Congress gave 
the Securities and Exchange Commission the task of investigating 
voting power distribution among security holders in electric and gas 
holding companies and their subsidiaries. If the Commission finds that 
the corporate structure or continued existence of any company in a 
holding company system "unfairly or inequitably" distributes voting 
power among the investors in the system, it is the Commission's duty to 
order the offending corporation to take "such steps as the Commission 
shall find necessary" to cure this condition.2 This paper is an attempt 
to ascertain what the Commission considers an unfair or inequitable 
distribution of voting power and the steps necessary to eliminate it. 
I 
THE COMMISSION' s GENERAL APPROACH 
The Commission was directed by Congress to interpret the various 
provisions of the act so as "to meet the problems and eliminate the 
evils" listed in section 1.3 This list includes a declaration that "the 
interest of investors in the securities of holding companies and their 
subsidiary companies and affiliates ... [is] or may be adversely 
affected ... when control of subsidiary public-utility companies ... 
is exerted through disproportionately small investment. . . ."4 The 
Commission has concluded that in aclministering the section requiring 
fair and equitable distribution of voting power Congress intended that 
the Commission should cope with the evil of "undue concentration of 
voting control in holding company systems"5 and that this required 
comparing the "relative voting strength" of the different classes of 
security holders in a company "with the relative investments" of each 
~ Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University.-Ed. 
149 Stat. L. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §79. 
2Id., §ll(b)(2). 
a Id., §l(c). 
4Id., §l(b)(3). 
5 American Water Works and Electric Co., 2 S.E.C. 972 at 985 (1937). 
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class. 6 In determining the investment of a particular class of security 
holders the Commission has been guided by another evil listed by 
Congress in section 1, namely, the adverse effect upon investors when 
"securities are issued upon the basis of fictitious or unsound asset values 
having no fair relation to the sums invested in or the earning capacity 
of the properties and upon the basis of paper profits from intercompany 
transactions."7 The Commission believes that the best estimate of the 
money invested in a company by a class of security holders is found in 
the property base shown on the company's books "after eliminating 
from the property and investment accounts such inflationary items as 
writeups and 'paper profits from intercompany transactions.' "8 In 
addition, the Commission generally considers the past earnings record 
of the company and estimates of future earnings in determining 
whether voting rights bear a "fair relation to the 'earning capacity of the 
• ' "9 properties. 
II 
WHEN DOES THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE OF A COMPANY UNFAIRLY 
D1sTRIBUTE NoRMAL VoTING PoWER AMoNG I Ts SECURITY HoLDERs? 
A. Determining Property Investment of Security Holders with 
Voting Control 
I. Subsidiary Operating Companies. Generally the Commission 
has found voting control in a subsidiary operating company is vested 
in the common stock, at least a majority of which is held by the parent 
holding company.10 In determining the property investment repre-
sented by the common stock the Commission looks at the company's 
most recent balance sheet for a statement of the security structure or 
capitalization. On its face the balance sheet may show a sizable 
percentage 0f the total capitalization allocated to the common stock and 
surplus.11 However, if the security structure contains preferred stock 
6 Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 8 S.E.C. 443 at 467 (1941). This comparison, 
however, must be weighted by differences in risk, return and other factors affecting the 
position of the different classes of security holders. Electric Bond and Share Co., 9 S.E.C. 
978 (1941); Middle West Corp., 14 S.E.C. 250 (1943). 
7 Sec. l(b)(l). 
s Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 at 233 (1943); Virginia Public 
Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943). 
9 Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 at 233 (1943). 
10 Community Gas and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943), and cases cited in following 
footnotes to this sub-section. 
11 E.g., in County Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947), the 
capitalization per books showed the common stock and surplus as representing 31.53% of 
the total. · 
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which is carried on the company's books at an amount which is less 
than its involuntary liquidation preference, the Commission adjusts 
the book figures to reflect the larger amount.12 If any cumulative pre-
ferred stock dividends are in arrears the percentage of the total capital-
ization represented by the preferred stock is increased to reflect these 
arrearages.13 Since both of these adjustments increase the percentage 
of capitalization represented by the preferred stock, they effect a 
corresponding reduction in the percentage attributable to the common 
stock and surplus.14 These adjustments in capitalization may be 
enough to show that the common stock lacks sufficient equity in assets 
to justify its carrying voting control in the company15 but the Com-
mission generally proceeds to compare the adjusted security structure 
with the company's property base.16 
As mentioned above,17 the Commission does not rely on the 
amounts stated in the company's books for the property or plant account 
unless these figures contain no inflationary items such as writeups. The 
Commission does not require any particular system of accounts for 
public utility companies which are subject to the accounting jurisdiction 
of either a state commission or the Federal Power Commission.18 The 
12 Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 10524 (1951); 
Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 7128 (1947); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 6167 (1945); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 19 S.E.C. 376 (1945); County 
Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947); Georgia Power and Light Co., 
18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943). 
18 Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947); 
Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (194~); Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 
(1943); Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6797 (1946); 
Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946); Memphis Street 
Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 (1949); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 
340 (1943); County Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947); Tide 
Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 
(1945); Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 10524 (1951); 
Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947). 
14 If, for analytical purposes, the Commission sets up a new balance sheet to reHect 
these adjustments, they are charged off against surplus. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 
Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945). This may create a surplus deficit which 
wipes out a portion of the common stock account. Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 
(1943); Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6797 (1946). 
If the surplus deficit exceeds the book value of the common stock, the preferred stock 
account shows an impairment. Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); Eastern 
Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947). 
15 Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947). 
16 This has been done even where the adjusted capitalization showed no equity left 
for the common stock. Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release 
No. 7822 (1947). 
17 Note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
18 S.E.C., TENTH ANNuAL RI!.PORT 73 (1944). 
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Federal Power Commission has promulgated uniform systems of 
accounts for utilities subject to its jurisdiction and the National Asso-
ciation of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners has recommended 
uniform systems of accounts which are identical with the Power Com-
mission's for present purposes.19 All of the state commissions reg-
ulating electric utilities have adopted one or the other of these systems.20 
The Securities and Exchange Commission requires all electric utilities 
not subject to accounting regulation by a state commission or the Power 
Commission to keep. their accounts in the manner prescribed by the 
Power Commission and gas utilities not otherwise regulated must keep 
accounts in the manner recommended by the association.21 
These uniform systems require the division of the plant account 
into three categories. Account 100.1 is to include the original cost of 
the physical plant when it is first devoted to public use.22 Account 
100.5 is to include any amounts in the book figures which represent 
the difference between the arm's length cost to the company and the 
original cost properly classifiable in Account 100.1.23 If the company 
paid more for its plant than it would in an arm's length transaction, 
because the property was purchased from the holding company parent 
or an affiliate seeking intra-company profits, or if after acquisition the 
acquiring company appraised the plant at a figure higher than arm's 
length cost, such excess must be segregated in Account 107.24 
If the_ book figures in the plant account contain any known elements 
properly classifiable in Accounts 100.5 or 107 they are usually deducted 
when determining the sums invested in the company's property.25 The 
10 F.P.C., UNIFORM SYSTEM oF AccoUNTs PRESCRIBED FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES AND 
LICENSEES SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT (1936); F.P.C., 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF AccoUNTs PRESCRIBED FOR NATURAL GAS CoMPANIES SoBJBCT 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT (1939); N.A.R.U.C., UNIFORM SYSTEM 
oF AccoONTS FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIBs (1937); N.A.R.U.C., UNIFORM CLASSIFICATION 
oF AccoUNTs FOR GAs UTILITIBs (1939). 
20 Kripke, "A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform 
Accounts 100.5 and 107," 57 HARv. L. RBv. 433 at 435 (1944). 
21 RoLE U-27, GBNERAL RoLEs AND Rl!GOLATIONS UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY 
HoLDING CoMPANY ACT OF 1935 (Government Printing Office Edition, 1946). 
22 Kripke, "A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Ac-
. counts 100.5 and 107," 57 HARv. L. RBv. 433 at 436; Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 
S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
23 This includes intangible items such as good will or going concern value, costs 0£ 
financing, organization costs and franchise costs. Florida Power and Light Co., 15 S.E.C. 
85 (1943); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
24 See cases cited in preceding note. 
25 Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Mississippi River Power Co., 19 
S.E.C. 65 (1945); Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 
10524 (1951); Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 
(1947); County Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947); Spokane Gas 
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Commission is not so often concerned with investigating the adequacy 
of depreciation reserves26 and, when they are found to be deficient, 
does not require a retroactive correction through a charge to earned 
surplus.27 But if a company admits its depreciation reserve is in-
adequate and proposes an increase, the reserve is adjusted to reflect 
this change.28 This reserve plus any others pertinent to the plant 
account29 are deducted from the adjusted gross plant to obtain the 
adjusted net plant. The latter is then combined with other net assets 
representing a present value.30 Against the total net assets, as adjusted, 
are ranked the claims of the various security holders in the order of their 
priority: debt, preferred stock at liquidating value plus arrears, and 
common stock. 31 
& Fuel Co., 16 S.E.C. 565 (1944); Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); 
Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 (1943); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 
(1943); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); North Shore Gas Co., 10 S.E.C. 504 (1941). 
In a few cases part or all of the known inflationary items were not eliminated from 
the adjusted balance sheet set up by the Commission but they were specifically noted and 
seem to have been relied on in reaching the conclusion that voting power was unfairly 
distributed. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 
(1945); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 19 S.E.C. 376 (1945); Electric Power & Light 
Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944). But cf. Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 6797 (1946). 
20 Possibly because elimination of inflationary items from the plant accounts frequently 
shows a complete lack of common stock equity in assets. E.g., Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 
16 S.E.C. 565 (1944). 
27 Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946). Cf. 
Indiana Hydro-Electric Power Co., 15 S.E.C. 941 (1944), where the Commission required 
an increase in the depreciation reserve when a company was in effect selling its assets 
through a merger into another company. 
28 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); Great 
Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 (1943); Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); 
Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945). In one case the Commission's con-
clusions appear to have been affected by the inadequacy of the reserve although the amount 
of the deficiency was not determined and the company had not proposed an increase. Ogden 
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943). In another case the Commission merely noted the small 
common stock equity "without taking into account any deficiencies in the depreciation 
reserve." Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945) 
at p. 9. 
29 Such as reserves previously set up by the company to cover inflationary items. 
These items, of course, are subtracted from the plant account only once. Georgia Power 
and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); Memphis Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 8942 (1949). 
30 Deferred charges sucli as capital stock discount and expense, debt discount and 
expense, revaluation expenses, and abandoned property being amortized are carried on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. The Commission excludes such items since they "do not 
represent any present assets or value in any real sense." Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 
445 at 449 (1944); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); Indiana Hydro-
Electric Power Co., 15 S.E.C. 941 (1944). 
SI E.g., Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Georgia Power and Light Co., 
18 S.E.C. 89 (1945). Another method used to show the effect of eliminating inflationary 
items and assets of no present value plus any increase in depreciation reserves is through 
additional adjustments in the capitalization comparable to those used in adjusting for 
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2. Holding Companies. When the issue is whether the corporate 
structure of a holding company controlled by its common stockholders 
unfairly distributes voting power among its security holders, deter-
mination of the property investment of the common stockholders differs 
somewhat depending on whether the Commission relies on the holding 
company's corporate balance sheet or upon a consolidated balance sheet 
covering the holding company and its subsidiaries.32 If the holding 
company's corporate balance sheet is used, the procedure is the same 
as the Commission follows in dealing with a subsidiary operating com-
pany, except for an additional problem of appraising the value of the 
holding company's investment in subsidiaries.33 These investments 
will constitute the most important assets of a company which is solely 
a holding company but are of less relative importance where the 
company is principally an operating company.34 Yet even in the case 
of the former, the Commission does not attempt an independent 
evaluation of the investments. It is only where the holding company 
itself proposes to write down its investment accounts that the Com-
mission adjusts the corporate balance sheet to reB.ect this change.35 
preferred stock arrears. See note 14 supra; County Gas Co., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 7948 (1947). 
32 The Commission generally uses one or the other but in three cases both were 
examined. Central Public Utility Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947); 
United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 (1944); Peoples Light & Power Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 6000 (1945). 
33 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); United 
Gas Improvement Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7913 (1947); Central Public 
Utility Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947); Eastern Minnesota Power 
Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7441 (1947); New England Gas and Electric 
Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 6729 (1946); Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 6723 (1946); York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944); 
Standard Gas and Electric Co., 17 S.E.C. 279 (1944); United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 
(1944); United Corp., 13 S.E.C. 854 (1943); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 
766 (1943); Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 (1939); Peoples Light and 
Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6000 (1945). 
34 Cf. United Gas Improvement Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7913 (1947) 
with Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6723 (1946). 
35 Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 (1939) (elimination of arbitrary 
writeups); New England Gas and Electric Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 6729 
(1946) (reduction to underlying book value); Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 8449 (1948) (reduction to nominal value pursuant to order of state 
commission, reduction to underlying book value of stock to be received after recapitalization 
of subsidiary); York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944) (reduction to undefined 
"present value" in anticipation of a sale of the investments). Cf. Standard Gas and Electric 
Co., 17 S.E.C. 279 (1944), where the company proposed to exchange investment securities 
for those issued by the holding company itself. The investment account was reduced here 
to the highest appraisal £gure offered by company witnesses. 
In Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7441 (1947), 
the holding company proposed to distribute its assets and dissolve. Here the Commission 
did take the initiative and reduced the investment account to the underlying book value 
of stock to be received on recapitalization of a subsidiary. 
1953] PuBLIC UTILITY HoLDING COMPANY AcT 77 
Where the Commission relies on a consolidated balance sheet 
covering the holding company and its subsidiaries, and where all of the 
outstanding subsidiary securities are owned by the parent holding 
company, the procedure in determining the property investment of the 
security holders is exactly the same as where the Commission is dealing 
only with a subsidiary company.36 But where some subsidiary securi-
ties are publicly held a question arises as to their relative position as a 
claim against assets. Publicly held subsidiary debt is ranked ahead of 
holding company debt securities37 while subsidiary preferred and 
common stock come in ahead of holding company preferred.38 Other-. 
wise, consolidated capitalization and assets are adjusted in the same 
fashion as the corporate capitalization and assets of a subsidiary 
company.39 
B. Determining the Relationship of the Securities with Voting 
Control to the "Earning Capacity" of the Company 
The Commission has found an unfair distribution of voting power 
without considering the relation of corporate earnings to the stock 
carrying voting control40 but in most cases such a finding is made only 
after a comparison of the controlling stock's equity in earnings as well 
as assets. Where the Commission is proceeding on its own initiative to 
investigate voting power distribution and where the company involved 
36 Kings County Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7060 (1946); 
Virginia Public Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); 
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943). However, where a consolidated 
balance sheet is used but not all of the subsidiaries are consolidated, there is still an invest• 
ment account to be considered. Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); 
National Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8445 (1948). Even 
where all subsidiaries are consolidated, the holding company may have investments in non-
subsidiaries. National Power & Light Co., ibid.; International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 
206 (1943). 
37 Central Public Utility Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947). 
Holding company debt was apparently unsecured here. 
ss International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 206 (1943); Central Public Utility Corp., 
Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); 
Republic Service Corp., 12 S.E.C. 852 (1943); North Continent Utilities Corp., 14 S.E.C. 
656 (1943); Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944). Contra: United Gas 
Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 (1944); Utah Power and Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1945). 
so See cases cited in preceding note. 
40 This has occurred where the Commission was dealing with subsidiary operating 
companies, Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 
(1945); Mississippi River Power Co., 19 S.E.C. 65 (1945), and with holding companies 
which were primarily operating companies. Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 6723 (1946); Kings County Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release 
No. 7060 (1946). Cf. New England Gas and Electric Assn., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 6729 (1946), involving a voting trust agreement which took away control 
from the stockholders. 
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has not proposed a voluntary plan to change its present allocation of 
voting power, the Commission's position is that the prospective earning 
power of the company is not in issue so past earnings, as shown in the 
company's income statements, may be relied on even though "historical 
earnings are not conclusive on the question of prospective earnings."41 
But if a company voluntarily submits its own plan for ensuring a fair 
distribution of voting power it frequently offers estimates as to future 
earnings and the Commission considers these as well as historical 
earnings in determining whether the changes proposed in the com-
pany's plan are necessary.42 
I. Subsidiary Operating Companies. Where only historical earn-
ings are considered, the Commission is interested in whether earnings 
have been sufficient to cover debt and preferred stock requirements 
and still leave a substantial share for the common stockholders or 
whether, due to a poor earning record, there have been debt defaults, 
an accumulation of preferred stock dividend arrearages, or a thin equity 
left for the common stock.43 Here the Commission is generally willing 
to rely on the :figures given in the income statements,44 but where 
historical earnings are being used as a basis for forecasting future 
earnings certain adjustments must be made. If the trend of operating 
revenues during the period studied is upward but this is due to unusual 
41 Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 at 169-170 (1942); Long Island 
Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948). But cf. Tide Water Power 
Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944), and Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944). 
42 Where the past record is very poor, the Commission sometimes relies on this alone 
and disregards company estimates. Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); 
Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946); Virginia Public 
Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943); Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); 
Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 (1939). H a company submitting a volun-
tary plan does not attempt to estimate future earnings, the Commission generally considers 
only past earnings. United Corp., 13 S.E.C. 854 (1943); North Continent Utilities Corp., 
14 S.E.C. 656 (1943); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); Ogden Corp., 
13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 (1943); Electric Power & Light 
Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944); United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 (1944). But in County 
Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947), and Memphis Street Railway 
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 (1949), the Commission made its own 
appraisal of earning prospects. 
43 Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 16 S.E.C. 565 (1944); Midland Utilities Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946); Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 6797 (1946); Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); 
Electric Power & Light Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944); Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 
(1943); Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 
12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943). 
44 However, if the company admits inadequate depreciation accruals in the past, this 
factor is noted by the Commission in appraising the earnings record. Utah Power and Light 
Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 (1943). Also see Electric 
Power & Light Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944). 
1953] PuBLIC UTILITY HoLDING CoMPANY AcT 79 
conditions, such as increased business during World War II, such 
trends are discounted.45 If during the period studied there has been 
an important change in the nature of the company's operations, the 
record of earnings since that change is entitled to the most weight in 
determining future eamings.46 The effect of a recent rate increase47 
or a construction program48 in increasing revenues may be considered 
but past earnings attributable to abandoned property must be de-
ducted. 49 Operating revenue deductions must be restated to reflect the 
impact of recent increases and anticipated increases in labor and 
material costs, federal income taxes and depreciation accruals. 50 
After adjusted gross income is obtained by deducting adjusted 
operating expenses from adjusted operating revenues past deductions 
from gross income are considered. If certain unusual deductions have 
been made in the past and are not likely to recur or if certain items, 
such as abandoned property, were being amortized over a period 
but are now to be written off completely, these deductions are dis-
regarded in determining future income.51 Contrariwise, if Account 
100.5 items have been found in the plant account, these are usually 
amortized, rather than written off immediately, and such new de-
ductions from gross income must be considered.52 Increased interest 
45 "Projections into the future which assume that revenues in wartime are likely to 
persist after the war ••• are, we think, unwarranted. We believe that substantial recog-
nition must be given to the pre-war level of operations as an indication of probable post-war 
levels." Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 at 127 (1943). The former may 
be increased somewhat, however, if war production activities have left a permanent popu-
lation increase in the service area. Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 
(1947); Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942). 
46 Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947). Cf. Memphis 
Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 (1949), where a change in 
the nature of the company's business plus other factors made historical earnings of little 
value and the Commission concluded that a precise estimate of future earnings was not 
feasible. 
47 Memphis Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 (1949). 
48 Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947); 
Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 10524 (1951). 
40 Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944). Properties which cannot be oper-
ated at a profit must be valued on a liquidation-in-operation basis and any operating reve-
nues obtained from them must be disregarded in determining long range levels. Southern 
Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
50 Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947); 
Minnesota Power & Light Co., 19 S.E.C. 376 (1945); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 
S._E.C. 115 (1943); Memphis Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 
(1949). In Indiana Hydro-Electric Power Co., 15 S.E.C. 941 (1944), the Commission 
increased past depreciation accruals to the amounts claimed for federal income tax purposes. 
51 Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 
S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
52 Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944); Minnesota Power and Light Co., 19 
S.E.C. 376 (1945). 
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charges due to £nancing of new construction53 and decreased charges 
through anticipated debt refunding at lower interest rates54 require 
additional adjustments. 
Adjusted net income remaining is compared with current preferred 
dividend requirements plus any existing arrearages in determining 
whether common stockholders may expect future dividends. 55 
2. Holding Companies. Where the Commission relies on the 
past earnings of a holding company, the approach is the same as with 
subsidiary operating companies, whether corporate or consolidated 
income statements are used.56 Where an attempt is made to forecast 
future earnings from past corporate income statements, there is an 
additional problem of estimating non-operating revenue from invest-
ments in subsidiaries.57 If consolidated income statements are used as 
a basis for forecast, b~ides adjustments of the sort described above in 
connection with subsidiary operating companies,58 the Commission 
occasionally attempts to determine how much of the consolidated net 
income produced by each subsidiary company may be drawn up by the 
holding company so as to be available for payment of dividends on the 
holding company stock.59 
53 Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947); Eastern Minne-
sota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947). 
54 Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
55 E.g., Minnesota Power & Light Co., 19 S.E.C. 376 (1945); Seattle Gas Co., Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947). 
56 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); 
Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 (1939); United Corp., 13 S.E.C. 854 
(1943); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 
340 (1943); Virginia Public Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943); Peoples Light & Power 
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6000 (1945). 
57In York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944), the company estimated a receipt 
of $12,000 a year from its investment in one company and no income from another. The 
Commission considered the earnings records of both companies for the past five years and 
several factors which might affect future earnings but no specific adjustments were made. 
However, when future earning estimates were based on an untried change in methods of 
operation, no provision was made for future increased costs of operation, yet the estimates 
were substantially higher than in past years, the Commission concluded that the estimates 
were unduly optimistic and lowered them to a figure slightly above the average for the 
past nine years. The Commission assumed the percentage of net income paid out to the 
holding company would be the same as in the past.. United Gas Improvement Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 7913 (1947). 
58 Central Public Utility Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947); 
Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 
S.E.C. 226 (1943); Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 12 S.E.C. 218 (1942); National 
Power and Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8445 (1948); Niagara Hudson 
Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944); Standard Gas and Electric Co., 17 S.E.C. 279 (1944). 
59 In Central Public Utility Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947), 
the holding company had estimated that 80 percent of the available income of its sub-
sidiaries would be drawn up but admitted that this would not be true of all subsidiaries 
since some would need to keep most of their earnings for future developments. Hence, the 
Commission discounted the company's estimates. 
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C. What Amounts to an Unfair Distribution of Normal Voting 
Power? 
1. Between Common and Pref erred Stockholders. The clearest 
case of an unfair distribution of normal voting power among the holders 
of common and preferred stock is where the Commission finds that the 
common stock with voting control represents no investment in adjusted 
net assets and has no chance of sharing in prospective earnings.60 As 
mentioned above, 61 the Commission is willing to rely on the past 
earnings record of a company, irrespective of its future earning power, 
so voting control in a common stock with no equity in assets and none 
in past earnings also violates section ll(b)(2).62 Emphasizing the 
congressional mandate concerning control through "disproportionately 
small investment,"63 the Commission has relied on the absence of any 
claim to assets as alone sufficient to show that the common stock should 
not have voting control.64 This is true even where the Commission has 
studied the past earnings records or future estimates which showed a 
substantial claim to earnings. 65 
60 County Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947); Utah Power & 
Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943); 
Indiana Hydro-Electric Power Co., 15 S.E.C. 941 (1944); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 
12 S.E.C. 766 (1943). Cf. Market Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release 
No. 9376 (1949), where the prior preferred stock had the only equity in the company 
yet subordinate issues of preferred stock combined with the common stock had voting 
control. 
61 Note 41 supra and accompanying text. 
62 In these situations preferred stock dividend requirements had not been earned in 
the past 6 to 13 years. International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 206 (1943); Ogden Corp., 
13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 
6797 (1946); Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7441 
(1947); Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); 
United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 (1944); Peoples Light & Power Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 6000 (1945). 
63 See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
64 Kings County Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7060 (1946); 
Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6723 (1946); Pennsylvania 
Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945). 
65 In Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943), there were no present 
preferred dividend arrears and corporate net income for the past 5 years averaged twice the 
preferred dividend requirement. In the other cases where past earnings were considered, 
preferred dividend requirements had not been earned in most of the years studied, Georgia 
Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); were barely covered, Tide Water Power Co., 16 
S.E.C. 445 (1944); Electric Power & Light Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944); or earnings 
applicable to the common stock could not be paid out in dividends because of a surplus 
deficit, Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946); or debt 
restrictions on payment of dividends, Virginia Public Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943). 
In Minnesota Power & Light Co., 19 S.E.C. 376 (1945), there were no existing 
preferred dividend arrears and future net income would cover preferred stock dividend 
requirements 1.4 times. In the other cases, some with greater coverage of the preferred 
dividend requirements, it would take 5 to 35 years to pay off existing preferred dividend 
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In the cases where voting control in a common stock with some 
claim in adjusted assets was still unfair to the preferred stockholders, 
the claim of the latter has been at least twice as great.66 
2. Between Holders of Equity and Holders of Debt Securities. 
Ordinarily, debt securities carry no normal voting power because of 
an assumption that they have no justifiable interest in the conduct of 
ordinary corporate affairs.67 It is the Commission's position, however, 
that "when debt is so insufficiently protected by assets and earnings that 
the creditors bear part of the speculative risk of the enterprise, a 
distribution of voting power which leaves the creditors disenfranchised 
is inequitable."68 When the stockholders have no equity in assets or 
earnings, the creditors are the real owners of the company ~nd must be 
given control.69 Where debt amounted to 87.8 percent of the adjusted 
net property, and earnings for the past ten years averaged 1.6 times 
debt interest, the Commission ordered improvement of these ratios.70 
arrears. Georgia Power & Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., 
Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947); York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 
(1944); Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943). Also see Green Mountain 
Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 10524 (1951); Long Island Lighting 
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); Central Public Utility Corp., Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 7691 (1947); Community Power & Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 
(1939). Cf. Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947), where the 
second preferred would be entitled to participation after arrears on the first preferred were 
paid off during the next 20 to 61 years. Also see Standard Gas and Electric Co., 17 S.E.C. 
279 (1944). 
66 The strongest common stock claim to assets was found in Mississippi River Power 
Co., 19 S.E.C. 65 (1945), where the common stock represented 12.72% of the net assets 
after elimination of inflationary items but the preferred stock represented 2.4 times as much. 
Prospective net income would cover preferred stock dividend requirements 2.3 times. Also 
see Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944), where the preferred stock rep-
resented approximately 2.5 times as much assets and past earnings showed a slender margin 
of earnings for the common stock. In the three other cases where the common stock had 
some claim to assets, the preferred stock represented from 4 to over 9 times as much. 
United Corp., 13 S.E.C. 854 (1943); Memphis Street Railway Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 8942 (1949); Columbia Gas and Electric Corp., 12 S.E.C. 218 (1942). 
67 That this assumption may have been true in the past but is so no longer, see 
DEWING, CORPORATION SECUBITIES 236-238 (1934). 
68 Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 at 131-132 (1943). 
69 Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942); Long Island Lighting Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948); Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 16 S.E.C. 565 (1944); 
Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943). Cf. Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 
(1943), and Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943), where the debt securities exceeded 
adjusted assets and claimed most, if not all, of the earnings. 
70Tide Water Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 445 (1944). In other cases, the ratio of debt to 
property ranged as high as 98 percent. Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943); York County 
Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); 
New England Gas and Electric Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 6729 (1946); 
Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946); Long Island 
Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948). 
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Even where bond interest would be earned 2.63 times according to 
earning estimates but debt would constitute 80 percent of adjusted net 
property, the latter ratio was so high as to cause an unfair distribution 
of voting power unless the company provided for a systematic debt 
retirement program which would improve the ratio rapidly.71 In 
another case where the ratio of debt to net property was 79.4 percent of 
adjusted net property and income deductions had been covered 
meagerly in the past, the Commission ordered the elimination of open 
account advances from the parent holding company, those advances 
constituting approximately one-third of the total debt. 72 Voluntary 
plans to retire immediately a substantial amount of debt securities have 
been approved as appropriate where the ratio of debt securities to 
adjusted net property was as low as 75 percent73 and the Commission 
has emphasized the importance of sinking fund provisions in the debt 
securities where the debt was less than 60 percent of net property.74 
III 
METHODS UsED TO CuRE AN ilNFAm D1sTRIBUTION OF NoRMAL 
VoTING PoWER WITHIN A COMPANY 
A. Recapitalization 
When the Commission finds that the common stock represents 
little or no equity in the company's assets or earnings and, hence, that 
the company belongs in substance to the preferred stockholders, one 
possible solution would be to shift normal voting power from the 
common stockholders to the preferred stockholders. But the Com-
mission has refused to approve this proposal for a number of reasons. 
It would leave outstanding a common stock with neither value nor 
voting power which could serve no other purpose than to snare un-
informed investors; it would leave the company with an overcapitalized 
structure and tend to prevent voluntary rate reductions; voting power 
would be vested in a stock with only a limited return and, if the 
common stockholders had any remaining equity in the company, it 
71 Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
72 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449 (1948). Also 
see Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9473 (1949). 
73 Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6458 
(1946); Florida Power and Light Co., 15 S.E.C. 85 (1943); Georgia Power and Light 
Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945). 
74 North Shore Gas Co., discussed at p. 92 infra. Although, all new bond issues 
must contain sinking fund provisions. S.E.C., THIRTEENTH .AmmAL REPORT 89 (1947). 
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would be endangered. 75 Transferring the common stock itself to the 
preferred stockholders is considered equally objectionable since there 
is no assurance that the preferred stockholders would not resell it. 76 
Nor is purchase of the outstanding preferred stock by the sole common 
stockholder appropriate since this does not cure the cause of the unfair 
distribution of voting power, control by a common stock with in-
sufficient equity in the company. The latter method was allowed only 
on the condition that the preferred stock acquired would be converted 
into a common stock.77 
Where the common stock has no realistic claim to assets or earnings, 
the Commission considers it appropriate for the company to cancel its 
common stock and reclassify the preferred stock, including any dividend 
arrears; into new common stock. Such reclassification "merely con-
stitutes recognition of the true character of the preferred stock and has 
no material effect upon the rights of preferred stockholders."78 Even 
where the common stock had an equity in future earnings, though not 
in present earnings or assets, the Commission has approved plans for 
recapitalization on an all-common stock basis, the new common to be 
fairly and equitably distributed among present preferred and common 
stockholders. 79 
Where a company proposes to recapitalize to cure an unfair dis-
tribution of voting power, the Commission has generally, but not 
always, refused to allow the issuance of new preferred stock along with 
75 These reasons were first advanced against a proposal to shift normal voting power 
from the common stockholders to the bondholders who really owned the company. Jack-
sonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942). But they have also been used to justify a refusal 
to shift normal voting power from common to preferred stock. See Utah Power & Light 
Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943) and cases cited therein. 
76 Ibid. 
77Electric Power & Light Corp., 15 S.E.C. 1048 (1944). 
78 North Shore Gas Co., 10 S.E.C. 504 at 519 (1941); Federal Water and Gas Corp., 
12 S.E.C. 766 (1943); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). Also see 
Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947) and New England Gas 
and Electric Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 6729 (1946), where the Commis-
sion considered only the lack of any equity in assets. 
The Commission also approved a plan to cancel existing common stock and convert 
existing preferred into new common where it was "questionable" whether the old common 
had any equity in earnings, since preferred arrears would not be paid off for 34 years, and 
there was clearly no equity in assets. York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944). Cf. 
Green Mountain Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 10524 (1951), where 
existing common stock with only a marginal claim to earnings was cancelled in consideration 
of the company's giving up certain claims against the holding company parent, the sole 
common stockholder. 
79 Eastern Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7822 (1947); 
Laclede Gas Light Co., 16 S.E.C. 26 (1944); Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 
182 (1939); Scranton-Spring Brook Water Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 
6458 (1946). 
1953] PuBLIC UTILITY HoLDING CoMPANY AcT 85 
new common stock. The Commission's original position seems to have 
been that recapitalization on an all-common stock basis was the "most 
efficient and effective way of ensuring attainment" of a fair distribution 
of voting power.80 Later, the Commission's reasoning seemed to be 
that if the capital structure was unbalanced because of a preferred 
stock investment which was much greater than that of the common 
stockholders, recapitalization must be on an all-common stock basis.81 
At present, a large amount of debt securities in the capital structure is 
the chief reason for the Commission's refusal to allow preferred stock 
in the recapitalized company. It is the Commission's opinion that 
retention of preferred stock below a heavy debt structure would put 
the new common stock in "a position of extreme leverage" and result 
in a continuance of control through disproportionately small invest-
ment. 82 Long-term debt totalling 68 percent of the adjusted capital-
ization and 74 percent of adjusted net property necessitated replacing 
outstanding preferred and common with a single class of stock. 83 The 
same result was called for where long-term debt represented 62.2 per-
cent of adjusted capitalization and 67.7 percent of adjusted net prop-
erty.84 A smaller percentage of debt plus a poor earnings record also 
indicates the inappropriateness of preferred stock in a company's capital 
structure.85 Thus, where long-term debt was 54.3 percent of a 
partially adjusted capitalization and 57.5 percent of partially adjusted 
net property, the Commission required recapitalization on an all-
so Commonwealth and Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 at 165 (1942). Even if pre-
ferred stockholders were given the right to vote this would not necessarily cure an unfair 
distribution since this group, ''limited to a fixed rate of dividends and a fixed liquidation 
preference, may well take only a limited interest in the management of the company's 
business. As long as their specific interests appear to be protected, they may be tempted 
to leave the management in the hands of the more vitally interested holders of common 
stock and thus, through inaction, permit control to be exerted solely by this smaller group 
of investors. Moreover, there are many practical difficulties in determining what precise 
allocation of voting power of different kinds would be fair and equitable between different 
classes of security holders." Ibid. 
81 Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 12 S.E.C. 218 (1942), where the preferred stock 
investment was over 10 times that of the common stockholders. 
82 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8449, p. 12 (1948). 
83 Ibid. Also see Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 
(1946). 
84 Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943). But cf. Pennsylvania Power & 
Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945). 
85 A poor showing on earnings was relied on by the Commission in addition to a large 
amount of debt in Memphis Street Railway Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 
(1949); Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945); Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 16 
S.E.C. 445 (1944); Virginia Public Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943); Eastern Minnesota 
Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7441 (1947). 
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common stock basis.86 The earnings record for the past nine years 
showed that preferred dividends had never been earned during this 
period and gross income did not cover fixed charges during the last 
three years. In County Gas Company, 87 existing debt amounted to 45 
percent of the adjusted capitalization. The company proposed a partial 
retirement which would reduce the debt to 40.71 percent and also a 
recapitalization on an all-common stock basis. The Commission con-
sidered these steps "clearly necessary" and was undoubtedly influenced 
by the failure of earnings to match preferred stock diyidend require-
ments in 13 out of the last 14 years while fixed charges were not 
covered during six years of this period. 88 
But where the earnings record is better and debt does not exceed 60 
percent of the capitalization, retention of a limited amount of preferred 
stock has been permitted. 89 Where preferred stock is allowed the 
Commission does not require that the preferred stockholders have any 
normal voting power. Preferred stockholders are deemed adequately 
protected if they have the power to elect a majority of the directors when 
preferred stock dividends have not been paid for a year, plus the right to 
veto certain corporate actions, such as the issuance of prior preferred 
stock, which might adversely affect their interests.90 
B. Reorganization 
, 
In cases where the Commission finds ·an unfair distribution of 
normal voting power affecting the holders of debt securities, it has not 
shown the same aversion toward retention of debt securities in the 
86 Kewanee Public Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6797 (1946). 
Although the Commission considered it desirable to eliminate certain items from the plant 
accounts, thereby increasing the foregoing percentages, no adjustments were made since 
the accounts were subject to the jurisdiction of a state commission which had not acted on 
them yet. 
87 Holding Company Act Release No. 7948 (1947). 
88 Where the Commission decides that preferred stock must be eliminated from the 
capital structure, the common stockholders may prefer to retire the outstanding preferred 
rather than convert it into common since the latter procedure may result in existing com-
mon stockholders losing control of the company. This procedure is permissible where the 
common stockholders make an additional investment in the company so as to increase the 
common stock equity to a satisfactory amount. Georgia Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 
89 (1945); Florida Power & Light Co., 15 S.E.C. 85 (1943); Great Falls Gas Co., 14 
S.E.C. 377 (1944). 
89 Plans involving retention of preferred stock which have been approved by the 
Commission are discussed in detail at pp. 94-96 infra. 
90 Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943). These limited voting 
rights are described in detail and evaluated in Leary, "Voting Rights in Preferred Stock 
Issues under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," 27 TEX. L. REv. 749 
(1949). 
1953] PuBLic UTILITY HoLDING CoMPANY AcT 87 
capital structure that it does with respect to preferred stock.91 In only 
one case has the Commission indicated that all debt securities should be 
converted into common stock. The company has proposed to retire all 
debt securities through cash payments or cash plus preferred stock in 
an affiliate company and then convert its own preferred stock into 
common. These debt securities constituted 81.6 percent of the adjusted 
capitalization and the Commission stated that any plan to distribute 
voting power fairly "must include provisions for the modification or 
elimination of its debt . . . the company has chosen an appropriate 
method . . . an attempt to retain any portion of the existing debt in 
the structure would have raised serious problems in view of the 
speculative character of the business of Transit and the unsatisfactory 
nature of the indenture."92 
When a company belongs, not to the preferred stockholders, but to 
the holders of debt securities, the Commission is not satisfied with a 
transfer of normal voting power to the debt securities. Instead, there 
must be "changes in the corporate structure, involving the issuance of 
new securities."93 The most appropriate method here is a reorganiza-
tion in which a portion of the debt securities are converted into new 
common stock and all of the securities junior to the debt are cancelled. 
When the debt securities were publicly held, the Commission approved 
a plan to set up a new corporation, transfer all assets to it, and have the 
new company issue bonds and common stock which would go to the 
bond and debenture holders of the old company.94 If the company 
belongs to its creditors but all of its securities, both debt and equity, 
are owned by the holding company parent, the latter may simply 
contribute a portion of the debt securities to the company being 
reorganized and this will result in an increase in the common stock 
equity.95 
91 "For an operating company, ••• a ratio of even 66 percent debt and no preferred 
stock may well be more conservative than a ratio of 50 percent debt plus 25 percent 
preferred stock." Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 at 472 (1942). 
92 National Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8445, p. 14 (1948). 
The company operated a local transportation system which included a deteriorated and 
obsolete railway system in urgent need of replacement. Earnings were of such a marginal 
and fluctuating nature that estimates of future earnings were not practicable. 
93 Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 at 458 (1942). 
94lbid. 
95 In Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943), a wholly owned subsidiary 
company had $3,884,000 in bonds and a $1,500,000 demand note outstanding. The parent 
proposed to contribute $1,200,000 of the note and $2,059,203 of the bonds and then cause 
the subsidiary to restate its capitalization at 58.6% debt and 41.4% common stock. The 
Commission considered this plan "appropriate to achieve compliance with the provisions of 
Section ll(b)(2)." Id. at 785. Cf. Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., Holding Company Act 
/ 
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Where the equity securities have some interest in assets and 
earnings, but not enough to support the existing debt structure, the 
Commission does not insist upon an immediate reduction of the debt 
but instead allows the company to bring in proposals for retiring a 
portion periodically until satisfactory ratios are achieved.96 
After a reorganization or a recapitalization resulting in a new class 
of common stockholders, the Commission generally lays down a pro-
cedure to be followed in the nomination and election of directors in 
order to free the company from control by the old directors and common 
stockholders when the latter receive little or no recognition in the new 
security structure.97 This procedure has involved the company's £.ling 
the names, addresses, and holdings of the new common stockholders in 
the offices of the Commission;98 notice of the £.ling of a list to be sent 
by the company to the stockholders of record, along with an invitation 
to nominate directors; restrictions on the power to nominate and elect 
directors;99 and the company's sending out an election notice accom-
panied by "impartial proxies."100 
Release No. 6065 (1945), where the parent proposed to contribute all of the debt securi• 
ties held by it, two-thirds of the total, in exchange for all of the new common stock to be 
issued. This plan was also approved. 
96 Appropriate plans involving systematic debt retirement programs are discussed infra 
at pp. 92-94. 
97 Republic Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 6820 (1946); Peoples 
Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6000 (1945); Commonwealth & 
Southern Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5825 (1945); International Utilities 
Corp., 15 S.E.C. 435 (1944); Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943); Puget 
Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 S.E.C. 116 
(1942); Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942). ' 
98 This list could be inspected and copies by any of these stockholders or their 
representatives. 
99 Generally, each holder of new common stock could cast one nominating vote for 
each share held, but no candidate was deemed a nominee unless he received a certain 
minimum (500 to 1000) of nominating votes. However, where a holding company, which 
had previously controlled the company being recapitalized, was to receive 1.1 % of the 
new common stock, the Commission held the holding company ineligible to make nomina· 
tions. Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). In a substantially similar 
situation, the holding company was barred from voting its common stock for the nomina· 
tion or election of any director. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 13 S.E.C. 226 (1943). 
When a holding company received no securities in the reorganized company, the existing 
management, previously elected by the holding company, was forbidden to nominate any 
directors. Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942). In the last two cases cited, only 
a minority of the new board could consist of past or present directors, officers of employees 
of the holding company or any of its subsidiaries (including the one changing its corporate 
structure). In the Southern Colorado case, 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943), no member of the 
board could be affiliated with the parent holding company. 
100 Examination of the solicitation material authorized by the Commission in connec-
tion with such elections shows that the proxy material sent out by the company management 
described the background of each candidate but did not urge the election of any particular 
nominee. But the Commission did allow other interested parties to mail, at their own 
expense, material advocating election of certain candidates. Letter from Harry G. Slater, 
former Chief Counsel, Public Utilities Division, S.E.C. (Nov. 28, 1947). 
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C. Merger or Consolidation 
Merger of a subsidiary into a parent, as a means of clearing up an 
unfair distribution of voting power among the subsidiary's security 
holders, has been required by the Commission when the subsidiary's 
properties form such an integral part of the parent's properties that the 
former cannot be operated independently nor can their earning power 
be independently evaluated.101 A lesser degree of integration plus a 
conB.ict of interest resulting from such integration when a minority 
interest in the subsidiary's common stock is publicly held makes merger 
of the subsidiary into the parent the only method, other than liquida-
tion,102 which will eliminate the unfair disttjbution of voting power 
that exists when the minority stockholders are widely scattered and, "as 
a practical matter, disenfranchised."103 
Consolidation of a holding company parent and its subsidiaries into 
one surviving company has been proposed by a holding company 
seeking to continue unified operation of the system's properties where 
separate recapitalization to cure unfair voting power distributions in the 
subsidiaries would result in the holding company losing control of them. 
The Commission considered such a plan especially appropriate since 
separate operation would be more inefficient and, hence, more costly.104 
101 Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943), where the subsidiary's property 
had been leased to the parent, only the parent made provision for depreciation and this in 
the form of an unsegregated amount covering the properties of both companies, and rental 
payments under the lease were adjusted so as to cover only the fuced charges of the 
subsidiary. Cf. Indiana Hydro-Electric Co., 15 S.E.C. 941 (1944), where the Commission 
approved a plan to merge a subsidiary company into a non-affiliate company, the latter 
having leased the subsidiary's property for a number of years so that the subsidiary ap-
peared to be an unnecessary corporate entity with no operating personnel. 
102 See note ll 1 infra and accompanying text. 
103 Sioux City Gas and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9303, p. 9 
(1949). The common stockholders of the subsidiary company would receive common stock 
in the holding company. Also see Mississippi River Power Co., Holding Company Act 
Release No. 5776 (1945); North Shore Gas Co., 10 S.E.C. 504 (1941). 
104 Long Island Lighting Co.,_Holding Company Act Release No. 9473 (1949). Also 
see Peoples Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6000 (1945). Cf. 
Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946), where the Com-
mission approved acquisition of the common stock of an operating company by a non-
affiliate upon the condition that the subsidiary would be merged into the purchasing com-
pany and thereby cure an unfair distribution of voting power in the subsidiary. 
Even where a holding company must divest itself of certain subsidiaries, in order to 
comply with other provisions of the act, and an unfair distribution of voting power must 
be cleared up before the subsidiaries are disposed of, merger of several interconnected 
subsidiaries into one of them makes a more attractive company for sale purposes. The 
Commission approved such a plan in Empire District Electric Co., 16 S.E.C. 322 (1944). 
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D. Liquidation 
No decisions have been found in which the Commission ordered 
a holding company or a subsidiary to liquidate in order to cure an unfair 
distribution of voting power among its own security holders,105 but in 
several cases the Commission has indicated that dissolution was more 
appropriate than recapitalization. 
In .Market Street Railway Company,1°6 the company had previously 
sold its operating properties and now proposed to pay off creditors' 
claims, distribute its remaining assets to its preferred stockholders and 
dissolve. The Commission considered this plan appropriate and prob-
ably would have ordered such steps if the company had not proposed 
them since the ·commission noted that "the assets of Market Street are 
almost wholly liquid and it has no income producing property except 
as it derives income from its holdings of government securities. In fact, 
since the sale of its operating properties, Market Street's expenses have 
exceeded its income and such den.cits will in all likelihood continue 
until dissolution."107 
In another case a holding company proposed to liquidate since it 
was unable to refund its maturing bond issue. A preferred stockholders' 
committee proposed recapitalization instead but the Commission con-
cluded that this would be only a temporary expedient causing unneces-
sary expense and delay and that liquidation was more feasible since the 
system consisted of an uneconomic combination of properties, the costs 
of keeping the holding company and the system service company in 
existence were high and the break-up value of the subsidiaries was 
greater than the value· of the holding company's assets on a going-
concern basis.108 Where a holding company had disposed of scattered 
properties, in order to comply with the integration requirements of the 
act, and remaining properties could not be integrated, separate operation 
would be at high costs, and the holding company could not carry out 
any necessary construction program, the Commission found a proposed 
liquidation program appropriate.109 
Liquidation as a method of curing an unfair distribution of voting 
power has been favored by management over recapitalization where the 
l05But see the cases discussed at pp. 105-106 infra, where the continued existence of a 
holding company caused an unfair distribution of voting power among the security holders 
in the holding company system. 
106 Holding Company Act Release No. 9376 (1949). 
101 Id. at p. 3. 
108 North Continent Utilities Corp., 14 S.E.C. 656 (1943). Also see Great Lakes 
Utilities Co., 11 S.E.C. 87 (1942). 
109 Ogden Corp., 13 S.E.C. 340 (1943). 
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latter would raise complex problems and prohibitive expenses. In such 
cases the Commission considers a liquidation plan appropriate.110 
Where recapitalization of a subsidiary would leave the parent with 
working control and the remainder of the common stock widely dis-
tributed, a conllict of interest problem would arise since the subsidiary 
was part of an integrated system. In such a situation the management's 
choice of liquidation was considered a proper method.111 
IV 
WHEN Is NoRMAL VoTING PoWER "FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY" 
DISTRIBUTED AMONG A COMP.ANY'S INVESTORS? 
Plans offered by companies seeking to comply with the require-
ment that normal voting power be fairly and equitably distributed are of 
value, when approved by the Commission, in determining when a 
corporate structure fairly distributes voting power, at least in those cases 
where the Commission allows the company to continue in existence or 
where the company surviving a merger or consolidation is examined for 
compliance with the requirements of section l l(b)(2). 
If a company is not required to lose its identity through merger, 
consolidation, or liquidation,112 a reorganization which eliminates all 
preferred stock and debt securities so that the company emerges with 
only common stock outstanding, each share carrying one vote, clearly 
effectuates a fair distribution of normal voting power.113 
Where plans proposing a debt-common stock structure are sub-
mitted, the Commission is concerned with the problem of whether the 
common stock equity appears to provide adequate protection, both as 
to assets and earnings, for the debt securities. The common stock would 
have "a real equity in the enterprise" when debt securities would 
amount to slightly more than 31 percent of net property adjusted to 
eliminate all items in the plant account exceeding original cost and 
prospective gross income would cover interest requirements more than 
two times.114 Debt securities amounting to 49 percent of net property 
were deemed appropriate where gross income would be more than twice 
ll0Eastem Minnesota Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7441 (1947); 
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 12 S.E.C. 218 (1942). 
111 Pennsylvania Edison Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6723 (1946). 
112 See pp. 89-90 supra. 
113 National Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8445 (1948). 
114 County Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7984 (1947). No mention 
was made of any sinking fund provisions in the remaining debt, which was not being 
refunded at the time. 
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fixed charges even though the plant accounts were not properly stated 
and the depreciation reserve appeared to be inadequate.115 A voluntary 
plan submitted by a wholly-owned subsidiary proposed debt consisting 
of an unsecured note, payable to the parent holding company in four 
years, amounting to 57 percent of net property after adjustments to 
eliminate excess over original cost and reflecting a substantial increase 
in the depreciation reserve. Interest would be earned 2. 75 times, 
according to earnings estimates. This plan was approved as bringing 
about a fair distribution of voting power.116 But where a subsidiary 
company proposed to refund its debt through sale of bonds and serial 
notes to the public and the new debt would amount to 58.97 percent 
of net property adjusted to original cost, the ratio was considered high 
and the Commission noted that the company proposed to retire all 
serial notes, over 15 percent of total debt, during· the next seven years 
and thereafter nearly 2.5 percent of the bonds each year.117 
Generally, when debt securities ranged from 60 to 73 percent of 
adjusted net property, the Commission emphasized the fact that these 
ratios would improve through the operation of sinking fund provisions in 
the bond indentures.118 A different method of increasing the cushion 
115 The company had previously agreed with the state public utility commission to 
restate its accounts in accordance with the Uniform System of Accounts of the N.A.R.U.C. 
Seattle Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7128 (1947). Again, no mention 
was made of sinking fund provisions although the bonds, when originally issued, provided 
for payments for 1½% of the maximum amount outstanding. Seattle Gas Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 6341 (1945). Cf. Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 7054 (1946). 
116 Great Falls Gas Co., 14 S.E.C. 377 (1943). 
117 North Shore Gas Co., 10 S.E.C. 504 (1941). Interest would be covered more 
than two times. 
Cf. United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531 (1944), where the Commission considered 
debt securities amounting to 53.32 percent of consolidated net assets, after adjustments 
to eliminate estimated inflationary items, as rather high for a holding company engaged to 
a large extent in natural gas and oil operations. Revenues from these activities had fluctu-
ated widely in the past although consolidated gross income for the past year covered debt 
interest well over three times. The Commission, in approving this amount of debt, empha-
sized the last year's earning coverage plus sinking fund provisions which would retire 80% 
of the bonds by the time the issue matured in 17.5 years. 
118 Jacksonville Gas Co., 11 S.E.C. 449 (1942) (debt would amount to 60 percent 
of net property adjusted to estimated original cost, depreciation reserves would be adequate, 
interest would be earned somewhat less than 2 times); Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 6065 (1945) (debt would constitute 62.9 percent of net 
property after elimination of all lmown inflationary items from the plant accounts and a 
substantial improvem.ent in depreciation reserves, interest would be earned more than 2 • 
times); Utah Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 764 (1943) (debt would equal 67 percent of 
net property after elimination of known inflationary items from the plant account and 
some increase in the depreciation reserve, interest would be earned 1.78 times); Georgia 
Power and Light Co., 18 S.E.C. 89 (1945) (debt would amount to 68.9 percent of net 
property stated at original cost, depreciation reserves would be adequate on a straight-line 
basis, and interest would be earned more than 2 times); Laclede Gas Light Co., 16 S.E.C. 
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below the debt securities was required by the Commission where debt 
was 69.7 percent of net property stated at original cost, without adjust-
ments for probable deficiencies in the depreciation reserve, and esti-
mated gross income would cover income deductions more than twice. 
Here the Commission ordered the company to sell more common stock 
to improve this ratio.119 The unwillingness of the Commission to rely 
on sinking fund provisions here might be due to the fact that the com-
pany had no specific plans for refunding existing debt but it was more 
likely due to the fact that the state commission had found depreciation 
reserves inadequate by· IO millions. If this amount was taken from 
surplus and added to the depreciation reserve, the d~bt securities would 
then equal 77 percent of net property. For when an operating com-
pany, and also a holding company, with an adequate depreciation 
reserve proposed to refund its debt through the issuance of bonds and 
serial notes equal to 80 percent of its net plant, 76 percent of total net 
assets including investments in subsidiaries and 75 percent of the 
proposed capitalization, the Commission was not satisfied with a debt 
retirement program which would reduce the debt to 63 percent of the 
capitalization in ten years. In addition, the Commission required a 
buildup of the common stock equity through freezing earnings equal to 
the amount of debt retired each year, less any additions to the capital 
account during this time.120 • 
When ratios are very unfavorable, the company apparently has a 
choice of rapidly reducing them or else suffering a restriction on 
dividend payments. Thus, a proposal by an operating-holding company 
to retain outstanding bonds amounting to 83 percent of adjusted net 
plant stated at estimated original cost plus the present value of invest-
26 (1944) (debt would constitute 63.6 percent of net property stated at original cost but 
the depreciation reserve was materially inadequate so the Commission required the diversion 
of a higher amount· of operating revenues into a maintenance and improvement fund than 
the company had proposed, interest would be earned 3.7 times); Memphis Street Railway 
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8942 (1949) (debt would amount to 73 percent 
of net property stated at original cost and the depreciation reserve seemed adequate, no 
precise estimate of future income was made since the company had recently converted to bus 
transportation and past earnings had fluctuated widely). 
119 Long Island Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9473 (1949). 
120 Estimated gross income would cover debt interest more than two times. Southern 
Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). But cf. Florida Power and Light Co., 15 
S.E.C. 85 (1943), where debt securities consisting of bonds, sinking fund debentures, and 
serial notes totalling 75.4 percent of a net plant containing sizable amounts of Account 
100.5 items and 74 percent of the proposed capitalization were allowed since it was 
estimated that the debt retirement program would reduce the net property ratio to 63 per-
cent in ten years. The depreciation reserve was considered acceptable and estimated gross 
income would cover interest requirements almost 2.5 times. 
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ments in subsidiaries121 was unacceptable to the Commission unless any 
dividend payments were banned or the company set up a systematic 
debt retirement program. The Commission was satisfied with a pro-
posal to retire enough debt so that the latter would equal 60 percent of 
net plant plus investments after nine years.122 But in the case of an 
operating-holding company proposing to replace bonds and sinking fund 
debentures amounting to 84 .41 percent of a consolidated net plant 
containing sizable amounts of Account 100.5 items, since this ratio 
would not be reduced to 60 percent for 15 years, the Commission also 
imposed a restriction on dividends until the common stock equity in 
total net assets reached 25 percent.123 
Plans involving retention of preferred stock in a company's security 
structure are analyzed to determine whether the equity of the common 
stock in assets and earnings is sufficient protection not only for the debt 
securities but also for the preferred stock. Only six of such plans have 
been approved. 
The largest common stoc;k equity in any of the approved plans 
amounted to 34.25 percent of the total capitalization. However, this 
constituted only a per books figure since no' analysis was made of the 
plant account or the depreciatiop. reserve.124 This was due to the fact 
that the company set up a pro forma balance sheet reB.ecting a proposed 
merger of two companies but no definite plan had been presented to the 
Commission. Earning ratios appeared to be adequate, after adjustments 
reflecting the merger,125 but the Commission reserved jurisdiction to 
take such future action as might be appropriate when a definite plan 
was presented, even though it stated that the merger would result in a 
fair distribution of voting power.126 
121 Debt would equal 92 percent of net plant alone. 
122 The depreciation reserve appeared to be adequate and interest would be covered 
about 2 times. York County Gas Co., 17 S.E.C. 644 (1944). 
123 There was some doubt as to the adequacy of the depreciation reserve and earnings 
were not quite double the interest requirements. Virginia Public Service Co., 11 S.E.C. 
415 (1942) and 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943). Also see Tide Water Power Co., 17 S.E.C. 776 
(1944) where an operating company proposed a sinillar restriction since debt would equal 
91.38 percent of the total capitalization and 87.45 percent of net property stated at 
original estimated cost, although sinking fund provisions would reduce the debt to 69 per-
cent of the total capitalization in IO years. Interest would be covered more than two 
times. The plan was approved by the Commission. 
124 Preferred stock and debt would be 16.97 and 48.78 percent, respectively. Secured 
debt was 52.84 percent of net property and the depreciation reserve 23.87 percent of 
gross plant according to book :figures. · 
125 Gross income for the past nine months, adjusted to reflect the merger, was 4.18 
times debt interest, 2.01 times total income deductions, and 1.72 times total income deduc-
tions plus preferred stock dividend requirements. 
126 Midland Utilities Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7054 (1946). 
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That a corporate structure may fairly distribute voting power even 
though its accounts are not satisfactory is also illustrated in Puget Sound 
Power & Light Company.127 There a common stock equity of 30.8 
percent was considered adequate support for preferred stock and debt 
amounting to 13.2 and 56 percent, respectively, of the total capital-
ization even though one-fifth of the common stock equity was repre-
sented by items which should have been segregated in Account 100.5. 
However, all Account 107 items would be eliminated under the pro-
posed plan and the depreciation reserve was substantially increased to 
an acceptable but not necessarily adequate amount.128 Estimated gross 
income would be more than twice fixed charges and more than I. 5 times 
fixed charges plus preferred stock dividend requirements.129 
Where the state commission had already required the company to 
restate its plant account at original cost and increase its depreciation 
reserve to the amount required on a straight-line basis and gross income 
would cover income deductions 2.89 times and income deductions plus 
preferred stock dividend requirements 1.90 times, the Commission had 
no difficulty in approving a capitalization consisting of 26.4 percent 
common stock equity, 25.3 percent preferred and 48.3 percent debt 
securities. However, the Commission did note that the company 
proposed to amend its charter so as to restrict dividend payments when-
ever the common stock equity dropped below 25 percent of the total 
capitalization.130 _ 
Sinking fund provisions in the debt securities plus a common stock 
dividend restriction designed to achieve and maintain a 25 percent 
common stock equity bolstered a plan with an initial common stock 
equity of considerably less than 25 percent to a point where the Com-
mission could label it "a satisfactory means of effectuating compliance 
with the requirements of Section ll(b)(2)."131 The company pro-
12113 S.E.C. 226 (1943). 
128 The company's accounts were subject to the regulation of a state commission which 
had not acted as yet on the Account 100.5 items or the depreciation reserve. 
129 Cf. Scranton-Spring Brook Water Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6458 
(1946), where the Commission approved a capitalization consisting of 28.6 percent com-
mon stock, 20.7 percent preferred stock and 50.7 percent debt. A major share of the 
company's property consisting of water properties, was not stated at original cost because 
the state commission, according to the company, did not require such properties to be 
carried at original cost. The Commission itself did not attempt to assert jurisdiction over 
such property. Interest would be earned 2.83 times and interest plus preferred stock divi-
dend requirements 1.73 times. 
130 King County Lighting Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7060 (1946). 
Such restrictions are uniformly required whenever a company issues new preferred stock, 
as was done in this case. See. Leary, "Voting Rights in Preferred Stock Issues under the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," 27 TEX. L. Rllv. 749 at 769-770 (1949). 
131 Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945). 
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posed to sell additional common stock and use the proceeds to retire a 
portion of the preferred stock. Common stock would then constitute 
13.75 percent, preferred stock 22.36 percent and debt securities 63.89 
percent of a capitalization adjusted to eliminate Account 107 items but 
containing Account 100.5 items nearly equal to the common stock 
equity. The company proposed to amortize the latter items over a 
fifteen year period and income deductions, including amortization 
charges, would be covered I. 79 times while these deductions plus 
preferred stock dividend requirements would be covered 1.33 times.132 
V 
WHEN DoEs THE CoRPORATE STRucTURE oF A HoLDING COMPANY 
UNFAIRLY DI$TRIBUTE VoTING PoWER AMoNG INVESTORS IN 
THE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM? 
The· preceding sections of this paper have been concerned with the 
problem of the security structure of a corporation, either a holding 
company or a subsidiary operating company, causing an unfair dis-
tribution of voting power among its own investors. But section 11 (b) 
(2) also contemplates the possibility of a holding company's corporate 
structure causing an unfair distribution of voting power not only among 
its own investors but also among the security holders of the subsidiary 
companies in the system. Where this is the issue ·before the Com-
mission a number of different approaches, sometimes alone, sometimes 
in combination, have been used in deciding this question. 
A. Emphasis on Holding Company Structure Alone 
It is the Commission's position that where the corporate structure 
of a holding company unfairly dismibutes voting power among the 
company's own investors there is also an unfair distribution of voting 
power among the security holders of the system as well when control of 
the holding company means, because of its investment in subsidiary 
voting stocks, control of the system.133 It would logically follow then 
182 Also see Minnesota Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 5850 
(1945), where a common stock equity of 16.2% was acceptable even though it was more 
than balanced by Account 100.5 items that were to be amortized over a 15 year period. 
Income deductions, including amortization charges, plus preferred stock dividend require-
ments would be covered 1.27 times. The Commission emphasized a proposed dividend 
restriction designed to achieve a 25 percent common stock equity and, also, that the 
company would continue subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission so that further action 
could be taken if the dividend restriction didn't work out as anticipated. 
183 International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 206 (1943). 
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that the Commission might confine its investigation to the security 
structure of the holding company, at least when it found an unfair 
distribution of voting power among the holding company's own security 
holders. And where the holding company's corporate balance sheet 
shows that net assets do not cover debt securities and corporate income 
statements show that the common stock, there being no outstanding 
preferred, has no present equity in earnings since large amounts of 
accrued interest must be paid first, such evidence has been held 
sufficient to show that the holding company's corporate structure un-
fairly distributed voting power among the system security holders.134 
It might be expected that in less aggravated cases the Commission 
would make the same sort of study and in Commonwealth & Southern 
Corporation135 the Commission, after adjusting the corporate capitaliza-
tion for preferred arrears, found the common stock and surplus repre-
sented only 42.35 percent of the total capitalization and surplus while 
the preferred stock at stated value plus arrears represented 52.63 per-
cent. Corporate net income had not been sufficient to cover preferred 
stock dividend requirements for the last nine years. From this the 
Commission concluded that the holding company's corporate structure 
unfairly distributed voting power among system investors. But the Com-
mission explained that this conclusion was based on corporate history 
alone without reference to comparable figures on a consolidated basis 
''because complete up-to-date figures on a consolidated basis are not 
presently available."136 When these figures were available, they were 
relied on137 and all other cases found, except the two referred to above, 
have relied in whole or in part on consolidated figures. 
B. Emphasis on Corporate Balance Sheet, Corporate and 
Consolidated Earnings 
In three cases where an unfair distribution of voting power was 
found to exist among system investors the Commission seemed to 
consider only the corporate balance sheet when investigating the 
common stock's equity in assets. After some adjustments such as 
restating preferred stock at its involuntary liquidation preference, in-
cluding preferred arrears, reducing investments in subsidiaries to their 
underlying book values, or eliminating inB.ationary writeups of invest-
134 North American Gas and Electric Co., 12 S.E.C. 750 (1943). Also see North 
American Light & Power Co., 17 S.E.C. 148 (1944). 
135 9 S.E.C. 609 (1941). 
136 Id. at 613n. 
137 Commonwealth and Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942). 
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ments and assets of no present value which the company proposed to 
write off, there was nothing left for the common stock.138 But in 
considering whether the common stock had any equity in earnings the 
Commission in one case relied on corporate and consolidated income 
statements in evaluating a company estimate that preferred arrears 
could not be paid off for at least thirty years139 and in the other cases 
relied just on consolidated earnings statements.140 
C. Emphasis on Consolidated Balance Sheets and Income State-
ments, in Whole or in Part 
In all the other cases where holding company structures have been 
found to distribute voting power unfairly among system investors, the 
Commission has relied on consolidated £gures, in whole or in part. In 
cases where both corporate and consolidated balance sheets were used, 
the Commission came to the same result on both· instruments. After 
adjustments for dividend arrears on holding company preferred stock, 
there were no assets for the common stock on either basis.141 In these 
138 Middle West Corp., 11 S.E.C. 533 (1942); International Hydro-Electric System, 
12 S.E.C. 999 (1943); Community Power and Light Co., 6 S.E.C. 182 (1939). 
189 While consolidated net income in the past might justify such a prediction, corporate 
net income would not since preferred arrears on the preferred stock of certain subsidiary 
companies had prevented the holding company from drawing up all available consolidated 
net income. The Commission concluded that there was little, if any, equity in earnings 
for the common stock. Middle West Corp., 11 S.E.C. 533 (1942). 
140 In International Hydro-Electric Co., 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943), the Commission found 
that only 9.9 percent of the average consolidated gross income for the last five years was 
applicable to the common stock. In Community Power and Light Company, 6 S.E.C. 182 
(1939), preferred dividend requirements had been earned only in 3 of the last eight years 
and the excess in those three years was "not such as to indicate a possibility of eliminating 
the present preferred arrears within a reasonable time, even if all of such earnings could 
feasibly be distributed." Id. at 190. 
·141 American Utilities Service Corp., 16 S.E.C. 173 (I 944 ); General Gas & Electric 
Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5950 (1945); United Public Utilities Corp., 
Holding Company Act Release No. 6908 (1946); Standard Gas and Electric Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 8773 (1949); Pennsylvania Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 8490 (1948). Cf. International Hydro-Electric System, 8 S.E.C. 485 
(1941), where the company used four different methods of evaluating its investments but 
the Commission concluded that there were no assets left for the common stock under any 
of the methods. 
142 In General Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5950 (1945), 
neither corporate nor consolidated net income had covered preferred requirements in the 
last 13 years. In Pennsylvania Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 
8490 (1948), corporate net income had not covered preferred requirements in the last 11 
years. Consolidated net income covered them only in the last year and then only 1.03 times. 
In Standard Gas & Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8773 (1949), corpo-
rate net income was insufficient in one year while consolidated net income had always 
covered preferred requirements, but there were large preferred arrears so the Commission 
concluded there was no foreseeable income for the common stock. In United Public 
Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 6908 (1946), consolidated net income 
had covered the preferred requirements in 4 of the last 9 years but since sale of a subsidiary 
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same cases, the Commission considered both corporate and consolidated 
income statements. In most of the cases there was no substantial 
difference so far as coverage of preferred stock dividends was con-
cemed,142 but in one of the cases there was.143 The discrepancy in the 
latter case was due to the need of the subsidiary companies for con-
struction funds and the holding company's lack of incentive to draw up 
earnings because of its capital deficit which precluded payment of 
dividends. 
In seven cases the Commission relied on consolidated balance 
sheets alone when searching for common stock equity in assets. In 
three of these cases, after elimination of inB.ationary items from the 
book assets or restating the preferred stock at its liquidating preference, 
consolidated net assets did not cover securities senior to the common 
stock.144 Both corporate and consolidated income statements were 
relied on in these same three cases and the Commission found no equity 
for the common stock on either basis.1415 In the other four cases the 
common stock equity in consolidated net assets ranged from 2. 77 per-
it was now insufficient. Corporate net income was always below the preferred requirements 
during this period. 
143 In American Utilities Service Corp., 16 S.E.C. 173 (1944), corporate net income 
had not covered preferred requirements in the last five years but consolidated net income 
had in four of those years. On the basis of the latter it was estimated that arrears could 
be paid off in nine years. 
144 In Community Gas and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943), combined net utility 
plant account per books was adjusted to eliminate 11 millions of Account 100.5 and 107 
items. After deducting publicly-held subsidiary securities from adjusted net assets, holding 
company debt was more than twice as much as the remaining property base. There was no 
outstanding preferred stock here. In American & Foreign Power Co., Holding Company 
Act Release No. 7815 (1947), the company proposed to write down consolidated book 
assets more than 231 millions from the book figure of 541 millions. Thirty-five millions of 
this difference was admitted to be inflationary and 6 millions consisted of unamortized 
debt discount and expense. The remaining assets would not cover publicly-held subsidiary 
securities plus holding company debt. In International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 206 
(1943), adjustment of the consolidated capitalization for arrears on holding company 
preferred stock left 4.24% of the total capitalization for the common stock but when 
deferred charges were excluded from consolidated net assets and the preferred stock was 
restated at its liquidating preference, the property base did not cover the preferred stock 
by 1 million. There were no holding company debt securities here. 
1415 In American and Foreign Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7815 
(1947), there had been no income applicable to the common stock on either basis for the 
last sixteen years and no future prospect of any. In International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 
206 (1943), no income had been available for the common stock on either basis for the 
last six years. In Community Gas and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943), the holding 
company structure consisted of debt and common stock. Corporate income apparently had 
not covered fixed charges in the eight years since the company had been reorganized. 
Consolidated income for the last year had been almost 1 ½ times fixed charges but the 
holding company had not received enough income from its investments to pay them because 
of working capital requirements and dividend restrictions of the subsidiary companies. 
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cent to 13.7 percent after adjustments.146 In one of these cases the 
Commission indicated that the corporate structure had always caused 
an unfair distribution of voting power among system investors even 
though the common stock at one time represented 16.3 percent of the 
total capitalization.147 When the common stock equity in consolidated 
net assets was only 2. 77 percent the Commission concluded that the 
corporate structure needed revision even if existing preferred arrears 
could be paid off within a reasonable time.148 In the other cases where 
there was a larger equity in assets, the common stock's equity in earnings 
was also considered but did not change the Commission's conclusions 
even where there had been consolidated income applicable to the 
common stock during the past six years and consolidated earned surplus 
was more than eight times existing arrears on the holding company 
preferred stock.149 
D. Emphasis on Non-Consolidated Subsidiary Figures, in 
Whole or in Part 
While the Commission has used consolidated figures more fre-
quently than any others when investigating voting power distribution 
among system investors, in some cases the Commission has relied on 
figures obtained by combining the figures obtained from separate sub-
sidiary balance sheets. In Northern New England Company,150 the 
Commission found that the common stock had no equity in corporate 
assets after adjusting for preferred arrears and was entitled to no 
earnings on a corporate or consolidated basis but then it considered the 
percentage of total subsidiary securities held by the holding company 
146 Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942) (2.7% of consolidated 
net assets after adjustments for preferred stock arrears and elimination of inflationary items); 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Holding Company Act Release No. 9633 (1950) (3.7% 
of consolidated capitalization as adjusted to reflect preferred arrears and elimination of 
inflationary items); International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942) (7.7% of 
consolidated capitalization after adjustment for preferred arrears); Niagara Hudson Power 
Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944) (13.3% of consolidated capitalization and 13.9% of consoli-
dated net assets after adjustment, in both cases, for preferred arrears). 
147Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944). 
148 Corporate net income did not cover preferred stock dividend requirements but 
consolidated net income did. Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942). 
149 Niagara Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944), where the Commission 
seemed to rely solely on consolidated income statements plus the actual amount of dividends 
paid on holding company preferred stock. In Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Holding 
Company Act Release No. 9633 (1950), the Commission relied on consolidated ngures 
and found that preferred arrears would not be paid off for a substantial number of years. 
In International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942), there had been consolidated 
net income applicable to the common stock in 5 out of the last 6 years but no corporate 
net income during this period. 
150 9 S.E.C. 224 (1941). 
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(15.1 percent) before it concluded that the holding company structure 
caused an unfair distribution of voting power among system investors. 
But even where the Commission has relied on consolidated figures 
concerning assets and earnings and found no equity in either for the 
common stock, it has on occasion double-checked this conclusion by 
combining net assets on the subsidiaries' books and eliminating in-
flationary items from these assets, then finding no assets left for the 
common stock, before concluding that the holding company structure 
needed revision.151 
The non-consolidated approach has been used most often where 
the Commission was dealing with a sub-holding company and ex-
amining the top holding company's investment, through its sub-holding 
company, in subsidiaries of the latter. Here the sub-holding company's 
capitalization is adjusted to reflect elimination from the investment 
account of any excess over underlying book value and the percentage of 
this adjusted capitalization represented by the top holding company's 
investment in the sub-holding company is then computed. This per-
centage is multiplied into the underlying book value of the sub-holding 
company's investment in its subsidiary companies. The product is then 
compared with the combined capitalizations of the subsidiary operating 
companies in order to determine what percentage of the combined 
capitalization is represented by the top holding company's investment 
in the sub-holding company. Where the top holding company's invest-
ment represented an interest of 28.8 percent of the adjusted capital-
ization of the sub-holding company but only 6.65 percent of the com-
bined capitalizations of the subsidiary operating companies, the Com-
mission held that the corporate structures of the sub-holding company 
which enabled the top holding company to control the operating com-
panies with such a small investment unfairly distributed voting power 
among system investors.152 The same conclusion was reached where 
the top holding company owned senior securities equal to 57.98 per-
cent of the sub-holding company's capitalization after adjustments for 
preferred arrears which eliminated the common stock from the capital-
151 Republic Service Corp., 12 S.E.C. 852 (1943). 
152 Electric Bond and Share Co., 9 S.E.C. 978 (1941). Other sub-holding companies 
in the Bond and Share system have caused an unfair distribution of voting power among 
the system investors. Bond and Share owned securities in American Power & Light Com-
pany which were only equal to 3.68 per cent of American's adjusted capitalization and 3.42 
percent of the combined capitalization of American's subsidiaries. Ownership of securities 
equal to 9.14 percent of Electric Power and Light Company's adjusted capitalization gave 
Bond and Share an investment of only 8.72 percent of the combined capitalizations of 
Electric Power & Light's subsidiaries. Electric Bond and Share Co., 11 S.E.C. 1146 (1942). 
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ization153 but only ~.35 percent of the combined subsidiary company 
capitalizations.154 Even where the top holding company's investment 
in senior securities of the sub-holding company equalled 17. 7 percent 
of the combined capitalizations of the subsidiary companies, the cor-
porate structure of the sub-holding company unfairly distributed voting 
power among system investors but here the Commission seemed to rely 
primarily on the fact that control was actually exerted through a 
common stock which had no equity in corporate assets or consolidated 
earnings.155 
In two cases involving top holding companies, each controlling 
several sub-holding company systems, the Commission relied on figures 
obtained by combining the separate consolidated capitalizations of each 
sub-holding company system.156 In United Corporation,157 the Com-
mission compared the amount of common stock and surplus on the top 
holding company's corporate balance sheet, after deducting preferred 
arrears and restating investment accounts at underlying book values, with 
combined consolidated book assets of the sub-holding company systems 
and found that $1 of such common stock equity controlled about $54 
in book assets of the sub-holding company systems. After also finding 
that the common stock equity in earnings was but a small fraction 
of combined consolidated system operating revenues and gross in-
come,158 the Commission concluded that the top holding company's 
corporate structure unfairly distributed voting power among system 
investors. In Electric Bond and Share Company,159 the Commission 
counted only the voting securities which the top holding company 
owned in domestic sub-holding companies160 and found they repre-
153 Preferred stock arrears were charged against earned surplus, creating a de£cit 
which was wiped out by a charge which completely eliminated the book value of the com-
mon stock and even a portion of the preferred. No adjustments had to be made in the 
investment accounts since the investments were carried at their underlying book value. 
154Middle West Corp., 14 S.E.C. 250 (1943). 
155 The sub-holding company's corporate balance sheet after adjustments to reflect 
reduction of the investment account to underlying book value left nothing for the common 
stock and consolidated net income for the last five years did not cover preferred stock 
dividend requirements. International Hydro-Electric System, 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943). Cf. 
the Commission's treatment of American & Foreign Power Company in Electric Bond and 
Share Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6121 (1945). 
156 Apparently, this approach was used in one case in order to separate utility from 
non-utility holdings and in the other to enable separate treatment of those sub-holding 
company systems where the Commission felt the top holding company's investment was too 
small. 
157 13 S.E.C. 854 (1943). 
158 Net income applicable to the common stock had varied from 1.197% to 0.377% of 
gross operating revenues and from 3.867% to 1.399% of combined consolidated gross income. 
159 Holding Company Act Release No. 6121 (1945). 
160 American and Foreign Power Company, controlling foreign subsidiaries, was 
excluded since Bond and Share had substantial holdings in the securities of that system. 
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sented 14.9 percent of the combined capitalizations of the sub-holding 
companies, after adjustment for preferred arrears, but only 6.2 percent 
of the combined consolidated capitalizations, again adjusting for pre-
ferred arrears, of the sub-holding company systems. In addition, the 
holding company common stock had not received any dividends in the 
past eleven years so the Commission held the corporate structure of the 
top holding company must be revised in order to provide a fair dis-
tribution of voting power among system investors. 
VI 
WHEN DoEs THE CoNTINUED ExisTENCE oF A HoLDING COMPANY 
UNFAIRLY DISTRIBUTE VOTING POWER AMONG INVESTORS IN 
THE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM? 
In the case of holding companies, as distinguished from subsidiary 
operating companies, an unfair distribution of voting power may result 
not only from the corporate structure of the holding company but also 
by reason of its very existence. Section ll(b)(2) requires the Com-
mission to check this possibility too. 
The Commission has most often found a violation of this aspect of 
section ll(b)(2) when investigating sub-holding companies. If the 
Commission concludes that a top holding company, through use of a 
sub-holding company as a pyramiding device, controls a group of sub-
sidiary operating companies through a disproportionately small invest-
ment, the Commission considers the continued existence of such a 
sub-holding company the cause of the unfair distribution of voting 
power among system investors. The disproportionately small invest-
ment is found in practically all cases by a consideration of the per-
centage of the combined capitalizations of the subsidiary operating 
companies represented by the top holding company's investment in the 
sub-holding company. When this percentage ranges between 2.6 
percent and 17. 7 percent the leverage created by the existence of the 
sub-holding company has helped to disenfranchise the contributors of 
such a large percentage of the combined capitalizations that the con-
tinued existence of the sub-holding company causes an unfair dis-
tribution of voting power.161 In one case the Commission dealt with 
161 The highest and lowest percentages were found among the sub-holding companies 
of the International Hydro-Electric System, 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943). The percentage in 
sub-holding companies of the Electric Bond and Share System ranged from 3.42 to 17.65 
percent. Electric Bond and Share System, 9 S.E.C. 978 (1941) and 11 S.E.C. 1146 
(1942). One of the sub-holding companies in the Middle West Corporation system enabled 
Middle West to control subsidiary companies with an investment representing 9.35 per-
cent of their combined capitalizations. Middle West Corp., 14 S.E.C. 250 (1943). 
104 MmmGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 52 
a top holding company which used a sub-holding company plus direct 
investments to control another sub-holding company, the latter being 
the only subsidiary of the :first sub-holding company. The top holding 
company's investment in both sub-holding companies represented 19.8 
percent of the capitalization shown on the first sub-holding company's 
consolidated balance sheet. The Commission held that this investment 
was so small that the continued existence of the first sub-holding com-
pany caused an unfair distribution of voting power among system 
investors.162 In most of these cases the Commission's conclusions have 
been based solely on the top holding company's small investment in 
system assets and there has been no mention of its claim to system 
earnings. In the few instances where the latter has also been checked, 
claims of 4.1 percent and 16.8 percent of the aggregate subsidiary 
operating companies' earnings have been too small.163 
In one case the Commission has found that the continued existence 
of the top holding company itself causes an unfair distribution of voting 
power among system investors because of its disproportionately small 
investment in the system. The capital structure of International 
Hydro-Electric System constituted 15.5 percent of the consolidated 
capitalization. No attempt had been made to value International's 
assets but its earnings record showed its capitalization was substantially 
in excess of the value of its assets. Average corporate gross income for 
the past ten years amounted to a return of only 2.2 percent of its 
capitalization. The highest annual gross income during this period 
was less than 2 percent of consolidated gross income. Hence, the 
Commission concluded that converting all the holding company's 
securities to common stock would not give the company a sufficient 
stake in the system to allow control to remain in the top holding 
company.164 
162 Louisville Gas and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7789 (1947). 
Also see Community Gas and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943). A still different approach 
was used in dealing with Rhode Island Public Service Company, a sub-holding company 
in the International Hydro-Electric system. The ill effect of this sub-holding company was 
evidenced from the fact that the top holding company spent 42 millions acquiring control 
of a group of operating companies, then organized Rhode Island and, by selling large 
amounts of non-voting securities in the sub-holding company to the public and writing up 
property accounts of the operating companies, the top holding company was able to recoup 
all but 12 millions of its original investment of 42 millions. International Hydro-Electric 
System, 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943). Also see American Water Works and Electric Co., 2 S.E.C. 
972 (1937). 
163 International Hydro-Electric System, 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943). 
164 International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942). In the only other 
, case involving a top holding company, the voting stock of an operating company was put in 
a voting trust and the trustees formed a corporation issuing non-voting stock to the bene-
ficial owners of the operating company. This had been done to prevent out-of-state interests 
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VII 
CuRING AN UNFAIR D1sTRIBUTION OF VoTING PoWER AMoNG 
SYSTEM INVESTORS 
A. When Caused by the Continued Existence of a Holding 
Company 
In situations where the continued existence of a holding company 
causes an unfair distribution of voting power among system investors 
one possible method of curing this condition would involve the holding 
company's increasing its disproportionately small investment in the 
system. Only one case has been found, however, where this method 
was used. The Commission had previously found that American 
Water Works Company had too thin an equity in one of its sub-
holding company systems and that the sub-holding company, American 
Communities Company, should be liquidated since it constituted an 
unnecessary complexity in the system.165 American Water Works 
proposed to transfer to American Communities the former' s invest-
ments in directly owned subsidiary operating companies which were 
outside the sub-holding company system. Instead of American Com• 
munities, American Water Works would then be dissolved. Also, 
two sub-holding companies would be dissolved after their publicly 
held securities had been exchanged for common stock in American 
Communities. Both steps resulted in an increase in American Com-
munities' investment in operating properties so that its common stock 
equity, after recapitalization on an all-common stock basis, would be 19 
percent of consolidated capitalization and consolidated gross income 
would cover claims prior to the common stock 1 .45 times. The Com-
mission found this plan appropriate to meet part of the requirements 
of section ll(b)(2).166 
from gaining control of the operating company, an event now unlikely to occur since enact-
ment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. The Commission held that the con-
tinued existence of the trust and the corporation formed in pursuance of it now caused an 
unnecessary disenfranchisement of the stockholders of the operating company. United illumi-
nating Trust, 7 S.E.C. 994 (1940). Use of a voting trust over a sub-holding company 
was held an unnecessary pyramiding device in International Hydro-Electric System, 12 
S.E.C. 999 (1943). H, however, the voting trust is set up for a legitimate purpose, there 
is no violation of section ll(b)(2). United Telephone and Electric Co., 3 S.E.C. 653 
(1938). 
165 Section ll(b)(2) forbids unnecessary corporate complexities as well as unfair 
voting power distributions. American Water Works and Electric Co., 2 S.E.C. 972 (1937). 
166 American Water Works and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7091 
(1946). The Commission did not expressly state that American Communities investment 
would be large enough and it did note that many of the subsidiary companies had not made 
original cost studies yet. 
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In most of the other cases the Commission, finding that continued 
existence of the holding company also unduly complicated the holding 
company system, has ordered dissolution of the holding company as the 
most effective method for complying with the requirements of the 
act.167 Before the dissolution order can be carried out, the holding 
company must normally rehabilitate any subsidiaries with defective 
corporate structures before distributing their securities to public in-
vestors.168 A dissolution order contemplates the possibility of setting 
up a new holding company to hold together a geographically integrated 
group of operating companies,169 and the order may be modified to 
allow the original holding company to continue in existence if it retains 
only those subsidiaries in which it has a substantial investment.170 
In one case the Commission did modify its dissolution order where the 
holding company had disposed of all interests in public utility com-
panies171 but'all the other companies subject to such an order have 
either distributed their assets and liquidated.172 or are in the process of 
so doing.113 
167Electric Bond and Share Co., 9 S.E.C. 978 (1941) and 11 S.E.C. 1146 (1942); 
International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942); Community Gas and Power 
Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943); Middle West Corp., 14 S.E.C. 250 (1943); Louisville Gas 
and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7789 (1947). 
In one case the Commission ordered the elimination of certain sub-holding companies 
as holding companies in the system. International Hydro-Electric System, 12 S.E.C. 999 
(1943). Apparently this meant they need not be dissolved if they became operating com-
panies through a merger or consolidation with subsidiary companies. 
168 International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942) and Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 9535 (1949); Electric Bond and Share Co., 12 S.E.C. 392 (1942) 
and Holding Company Act Release No. 9359-A (1949). 
169 In Electric Power & Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 8889 (1949), 
Electric proposed the setting up of a new holding company over four subsidiary operating 
companies. The capitalization of the new company would consist of common stock only 
and would represent 32.5 percent of consolidated capitalization after elimination of infla-
tionary items from the accounts of the subsidiary companies. Estimated consolidated net 
income would equal $1.78 per share of holding company stock. The plan was approved 
by the Commission. Also see American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release 
No. 6158 (1945). 
170 One holding company contemplated making such a partial divestment but later gave 
up the idea. Electric Bond and Share Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9359-A 
(1949); American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9948 (1950). 
Also see Electric Bond and Share Co., 11 S.E.C. 1146 (1942). 
171 Electric Bond and Share Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 10640 (1951). 
112 Community Gas and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 6436 (1946); 
Electric Power & Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 8889 (1949); Middle 
West Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7905 (1947); Louisville Gas and Electric 
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7789 (1947). 
173 American Power & Light Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 9948 (1950); 
International Hydro-Electric System, Holding Company Act Release No. 9535 (1949). 
The sub-holding companies subject to an order to cease being part of their parent's 
system (note 166 supra) proposed to consolidate with their parent into a new corporation 
with a debt-common stock structure. The common stock would represent 27.3 percent of 
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B. When Caused by the Corporate Structure of a Holding 
Company 
107 
In a number of cases the Commission has found that both the 
continued existence and the corporate structure of a holding company 
cause an unfair distribution among system investors. Since a dissolution 
order is the usual remedy to cure an unfair distribution of voting 
power caused by the continued existence of a holding company, it is 
used in these cases where there is also a defective corporate structure.174 
Where only the holding company's corporate structure has been found 
the cause of an unfair distribution of voting power, dissolution has also 
been ordered where the holding company has been found to perform 
no useful function in the holding company system.175 In such a 
situation, a voluntary plan to liquidate the holding company is, of 
course, an appropriate method for complying with section l l(b)(2).176 
The same is true even where the holding company is not a useless 
entity and the corporate structure could be readjusted in such a way as 
to distribute voting power fairly.1 77 But where the holders of debt 
securities are secure in their claims and the preferred stockholders are 
found to have most, if not all, of the equity in the company, the usual 
order is for recapitalization on an all-common stock basis.178 Recapital-
the consolidated capitalization after elimination of inflationary items and estimated con-
solidated gross income would cover £xed charges 2.22 times. The Commission approved 
this plan after expressly finding that the new common stock would represent the "real 
equity" in the system. New England Power Assn., Holding Company Act Release No. 
6470 (1946). 
174 In International Hydro-Electric System, 11 S.E.C. 888 (1942), the Commission 
discussed the possibility of a reorganization of the capital structure but found this method 
was not feasible since International would still have too small an investment in the system. 
But in International Hydro-Electric System, 12 S.E.C. 999 (1943), the Commission seemed 
to rely chiefly on the finding that the holding company was an unnecessary corporate 
complexity for its conclusion that dissolution should be ordered. 
175 International Utilities Corp., 13 S.E.C. 206 (1943); North American Gas and 
Electric Co., 12 S.E.C. 750 (1943). 
176 North American Light & Power Co., 17 S.E.C. 148 (1944). Cf. General Gas & 
Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5950 (1945), where a sub-holding 
company was allowed to retire all publicly-held securities and convert those remaining into 
common stock prior to resolution of the issue concerning the continued existence of the 
company. 
177 United Public Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 8352 (1948); 
Northern New England Co., 9 S.E.C. 224 (1941) and Holding Company Act Release No. 
7511 (1947); Commonwealth & Southern Corp., Holding Company Act Release Nos. 7615 
(1947) and 8633 (1948). 
178 American Utilities Service Corp., 16 S.E.C. 173 (1944); Commonwealth & South-
ern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942) and 19 S.E.C. 242 (1945); Electric Bond and Share Co., 
Holding Company Act Release No. 6121 (1945); American & Foreign Power Co., Holding 
Company Act Release No. 9044 (1949); Middle West Corp., 11 S.E.C. 533 (1942); 
Pennsylvania Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 8490 (1948). 
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izations which result in a common stock equity of from 25 to 34 percent 
of the consolidated capitalization, after adjustments to eliminate known 
inflationary items, have been approved as giving the common stock a 
sufficient investment in the system to justify control.179 There seems 
to be a possibility that a smaller common stock equity would be per-
missible if the holding company eliminated its debt as well as its 
preferred stock.180 But even where the common stock equity is large 
enough· to justify its control of the system, senior securities are not 
allowed in the holding company structure where there are large amounts 
of senior securities in the subsidiary company structures.181 This policy 
seems to be based on the Commission's belief that senior securities in 
a holding company over senior securities in the subsidiary companies 
would unduly and unnecessarily complicate the holding system.182 
Conclusions 
The Commission's basic premise is that voting power attached to 
equity securities should be in proportion to the investment represented 
by those securities. This seems to accord with congressional intention 
Sometimes the recapitalization order is based in part on the necessity of eliminating 
corporate complexities. Niagara Hudson Power Co., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944). 
As an alternative to recapitalization on an all-common stock basis, the holding com-
pany is permitted to form a consolidated corporation with some of its subsidiaries so long 
as the corporate structure of the consolidated corporation does not unfairly distribute voting 
power. In Buffalo, Niagara and Eastern Power Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 
6083 (1945), the Commission approved a plan to set up such a consolidated corporation 
where the common stock equity would be 24.75 percent of the consolidated capitalization 
after elimination of estimated inflationary items in the plant accounts and increasing deficient 
depreciation reserves. 
179 American & Foreign Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7815 (1947); 
Commonwealth & Southern Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7615 (1947); 
Middle West Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 6606 (1946); Eastern Gas and 
Fuel Associates, Holding Company Act Release No. 9633 (1950); Niagara Hudson Power 
Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944). Cf. American Water Works and Electric Co., 2 S.E.C. 972 
(1937), where a recapitalization resulting in a common stock equity of 19 percent was 
held to improve voting distribution. 
180 Community Gas and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 532 (1943), where the Commission 
stated that where only 16.4 percent of the adjusted consolidated net assets were applicable 
to holding company securities, including debt, this represented the maximum leverage 
compatible with the standards of the act. 
' 181 Standard Gas and Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 8773 (1949); 
Commonwealth and Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942). 
In the two cases where a holding company was allowed to retain preferred stock in its 
corporate structure there appeared to be no subsidiary preferred stock outstanding. Niagara 
Hudson Power Corp., 16 S.E.C. 139 (1944); Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Holding 
Company Act Release No. 9633 (1950). In the one case where the Commission sanc-
tioned a sizable amount of debt securities, there were no subsidiary senior securities. 
Republic Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 6820 (1946). But cf. American 
and Foreign Power Co., Holding Company Act Release Nos. 7815 (1947) and 9044 (1949). 
1s2 Commonwealth & Southern Corp., 11 S.E.C. 138 (1942). 
1953] PuBuc UTILITY HoLDING CoMPANY AcT 109 
in enacting the voting power provision of the Holding Company Act, 
although in apparent conflict with the policy reflected in state corpora-
tion statutes which allow shareholders only such voting rights as are 
provided in the articles of incorporation. The difference is due to the 
fact that state corporation statutes are largely enabling acts rather than 
regulatory legislation so far as voting rights for stockholders are con-
cerned, while the Holding Company Act, like state blue sky laws, is 
designed to protect investors against the issuance of certain types of 
corporate securities. The latter type of statute is, of course, bottomed on 
the assumption that at least some corporate investors are unable to 
protect themselves because of lack of intelligence, inertia, or limited 
financial strength. 
Assuming that voting power should be limited to the financial inter-
est of the voter, application of the principle to actual corporations 
involves at least two administrative problems. One is to define voting 
power. In this paper, the term has been restricted to the right to vote 
on all matters which the directors are required to submit to stockholders 
generally. The Commission has not attempted an exact definition of 
the term but seems to have this sort of concept in mind when comparing 
voting rights with investments. The other and more serious problem 
is to determine the stockholder's investment. Here the Commission 
has adopted an original cost approach in determining the stockholders' 
claim to assets. Although it is difficult to find any clear congressional 
intent on this point and the original cost concept has been severely 
criticized by many economists, this method of measurement does have 
considerable convenience for the Commission since it allows reliance 
on original cost studies required and approved by the Federal Power 
Commission and state regulatory commissions. Any inequities resulting 
from the use of this approach are mitigated somewhat when the Com-
mission's decisions are based in part on stockholders' claim to earnings. 
Also, when a corporation is recapitalized or reorganized in order to 
distribute voting power more fairly, the Commission requires a fair 
distribution · of the new securities and recognizes future corporate 
earning power as the primary test of fairness.183 
Assuming that the Commission accurately determines the stock-
holder's voting power and his financial contribution to the company, 
the ratios allowed by the Commission seem quite liberal. It may be 
doubted whether the voting power distribution allowed a particular 
company has any substantial value as precedent when another corn-
183 Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943). 
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pany' s structure is before the Commission for decision. Plans approved 
by the Commission have varied greatly in the amount of debt securities 
allowed, the common stock equity, and the degree to which the com-
pany's accounts adhere to the original cost method of accounting. The 
Commission seems to prefer a B.exible approach in this area. Such a 
view militates against the building up of stable rules of law as a guide 
to future action. The Commission may feel, however, that its decisions 
here would in any case be of very limited value as precedent. Com-
panies that divorce themselves from a holding company system are no 
longer subject to the Holding Company Act. Those holding companies 
that remain subject to the act will be controlled as to any future security 
issues. In determining whether a company should be allowed under 
sections 6 and 7 to issue new securities, the Commission can control 
the amount of debt and preferred stock and thus prevent the unfair 
distribution of voting power against which section I I (b )(2) is aimed. 
Only in the event of another major economic catastrophe resulting in 
serious reductions in utility earnings is there a likelihood of another 
major revamping of a utility's corporate structure. It is also unlikely 
that the Commission's decisions in this area would be helpful outside of 
the utility field where the original cost concept is most widely used. 
